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21 Executive summary
This paper examines the strategy for obtaining adequate resources for the
Indian State, where the goals of the State comprise the provision of public
goods (which, by denition, benet everyone) and income transfers to those
below the poverty line.
Living beyond our means is infeasible in the long run. A government has
to fundamentally spend only tax revenues. The failure to live within our
means yields the risk of crisis, it reduces the headroom available for policy
makers to respond to catastrophic events, and it reduces the average GDP
growth rate. The key parameter that requires focus is the ratio of government
debt to the output of one year (i.e. GDP). This is analogous to the ratio of
the indebtedness of a person divided by annual income. The two key rules
which India must attain are: (a) This ratio must not cross 60 per cent and
(b) In most years, this ratio must decline. It must be emphasised that this
discussion of the debt/GDP ratio pertains to the aggregate consolidated debt
of centre, states and local governments, and not just the debt of the central
government.
Unlike some Asian countries who have a long history of scal prudence, India
has a long history of scal stress. Hence, these concerns have to be taken
seriously. At present, the debt/GDP ratio is well above 60 per cent and
an immediate reduction of over 20 percentage points is required. Happily,
the international experience shows that it is not dicult for a country to
get sharp reductions in the debt/GDP ratio over a few years. The scal
consolidation plan presented in the report of the 13th Finance Commission
envisages a reduction of the debt/GDP ratio (of the Centre alone) from 80.7
per cent to 68 per cent over ve years.
Once spending by borrowing is ruled out, resourcing the State is primarily
about tax revenues. The most powerful determinant of tax revenues in India,
in coming decades, is going to to be sheer GDP. The international evidence
shows that a country of India's level of per capita GDP nds it very hard
to achieve a tax/GDP ratio of above 20 per cent. The experience of other
countries including emerging markets suggests that it is only when per capita
GDP crosses $9,206 that the tax/GDP ratio is able to get beyond 20 per cent.
Hence, for the forseeable future, the scenario that we have to envisage is one
where the tax/GDP ratio works out to 20 per cent. It must be emphasised
that this prospect, of a tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent, pertains to the ag-
gregate total tax revenues of the Indian State, summing across centre, states
and municipalities.
3While keeping this goal of a tax/GDP ratio in mind, there are seven imme-
diate areas where tax policy can yield immediate increases in GDP. These
are worth undertaking because even though the tax/GDP ratio will not go
beyond 20 per cent or so, the overall tax revenues will go up owing to larger
GDP:
1. When a series of distortionary taxes is replaced by the GST, Indian
GDP will go up signicantly, reaping the benets of a dynamic `com-
mon market'. The GST will help spur labour-intensive manufacturing,
including export-oriented manufacturing, in poor regions of India.
2. The second is a gradual evolution of the personal income tax to a point
where a full one-third of the households of India pay income tax, albeit
at a low rate. This will encourage a better engagement of the citizenry
in public goods: A citizen that pays income tax is likely to be more
demanding about the performance of government agencies. In addition,
a broad tax base enables reduced rates, which strengthens GDP growth
by reducing tax-induced distortions and reducing the size of the black
economy.
3. We are now ready for the end-game of customs reforms, which involves
eliminating customs duties on manufacturing.
4. New thinking needs to be brought into the question of taxation of
capital. Conceptually, Indian GDP growth critically requires immense
`capital deepening' where trillions of rupees need to be devoted into
building up the capital stock of the economy, which is the path to high
output and high wages. The key idea proposed here is a scaling up
of the exempt-exempt-tax (EET) system of taxation to cover a much
broader array of investments by individuals, through which individuals
will be incentivised to save and invest (thus helping the growth of the
country), but will be taxed when the liquidate their investments for the
purpose of consumption.
5. Fundamental rethinking of the taxation of corporations is called for.
Corporations, associations, clubs, partnerships, etc., are all mere mech-
anisms through which individuals obtain income. As long as the com-
prehensive income of individuals is taxed, once, the purpose of tax
policy is met, and this implies elimination of the income tax on cor-
porations. It is more ecient for India if we tax the individuals who
own corporations, instead of getting into the complications of taxing
corporations while trying to have a dividend distribution tax in order
to counter-balance the double-taxation.
46. As with all maturing middle-income countries, India needs to graduate
to the `residence-based taxation' approach for dealing with cross-border
capital ows. At present, this is the de facto reality given the Mauritius
route. Eciency gains are available by making it the de jure route for
capital coming in from all major countries, e.g. the members of oecd.
7. There is a case for an estate duty, through which the intensication of
wealth concentration across generations can be counteracted. At the
same time, the size of this estate duty needs to be modest, so as to
avoid distorting the incentives for hard work in each generation.
All these seven areas for reform will foster higher GDP, and interacting with
relatively small changes in the tax/GDP ratio, will yield bigger resources for
the exchequer. Alongside this, a fresh approach to the portfolio of assets of
the State is required. It is far better for the government to own 2000 km.
of highways or \greener" environmental capital, instead of owning Rs.10,000
crore of shares of Air India.
There are two areas where ownership of companies or shares by the govern-
ment is clearly inappropriate. The rst is the goods and services of ordinary
competitive markets (e.g. hotels or steel). These things are best done by
competing private rms. The second is in regulated industries. The owner-
ship by government of companies in a regulated industry { e.g. telecom {
reduces the condence of the private sector in the extent to which policy and
regulation will be unbiased, and thus deters investment into these areas.
A fresh eort on rethinking the portfolio of government, shifting away from
public ownership either in competitive markets or in regulated industries, will
generate massive resources for the exchequer, and also spur GDP growth.
Since the proceeds from the sale of assets will not be a continuous ow
of resources coming into the State for the long term, spending this money
on consumption expenditure of the government (e.g. for paying salaries of
policemen or for running welfare programs) is not appropriate. The best
use of these resources would be to unburden the government of debt, thus
bringing down the ow of annual interest payments which presently stands
at 3.6 per cent of GDP for the Centre alone.
We turn to the challenge of envisioning a European-style social democracy
in India. Evidence is oered showing low levels of \trust capital" in India.
As is well known to political scientists, welfare states are unlikely to be
successful or ourish in countries with high heterogeneity and low levels of
trust capital. Hence, we argue that India is not fertile ground for the creation
of a European-style welfare state, for the coming 10 to 20 years.
5A more fruitful line of enquiry concerns a rethinking of government programs
in an incentive-compatible way. Three key ideas need to be emphasised.
The rst is the `Aadhar' program, which can ideally culminate with every
household under the poverty line having a number, a bank account, and
being known in a master table of the poor households of India held with the
Ministry of Finance. Once this is in place, the comprehensive elimination of
poverty in India is feasible through the direct transfer of Rs.2,292 per month
into each household directly from North Block into the bank account of this
list of the households below the poverty line. The cost of such a program
would be 2 per cent of GDP, which is well within the goal of spending no
more than 20 per cent of GDP.
The second theme that deserves emphasis is decentralisation. Local govern-
ments are of particular importance in cities. We need to pursue the `Un-
nished Revolution' launched by Rajiv Gandhi through the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments by achieving genuine local government, atleast
in cities. The GST reform can be accompanied by a mechanism through
which a part of the GST collections of a city are paid as tax revenues of that
very city, thus closing the loop from public goods to higher GDP to greater
resources within each city of India. The third theme that deserves emphasis
is the decoupling of public expenditure from public provision. In many areas,
it is more ecient for government to contract-out the actual production of
public goods, while continuing to fund their creation. While this can work
well in some areas (such as education or health) it is not useful for core public
goods which are defence, police and judiciary.
European-style social democracy is seen as a safety net where individuals
are protected from an array of risks. Social programs which interact with
individuals are transaction-intensive and hard to implement, particularly in
the contemporary Indian governance environment. However, a substantial
part of the problem that these programs seek to address can be addressed
by macroeconomic policy frameworks which reduce the uctuations of the
market economy. As an example, in the downturn of 2008, many workers in
India were thrown out of job. While a system of unemployment insurance
is one way to address their concerns, it is also important to undertake the
scal, nancial and monetary institution building through which business
cycle stabilisation is achieved. This is a key area where the new issues that
India faces, as a middle income economy, necessitate substantial reforms
when compared with the institutional apparatus presently in place.
Two scenarios for the next few decades are presented in the paper. In the
rst scenario, India pushes ahead to a tax/GDP ratio of 24 per cent, with an
6early expansion of welfare programs, weak institutional reforms in the areas
of scal, nancial and monetary policy, and a low pace of integration into the
world economy. This scenario is projected to yield a trend GDP growth of
6 per cent. In the alternative scenario, India accepts a tax/GDP ratio of 20
per cent, and holds back on expenditure programs which will go beyond this
level of resources. This is a scenario which goes along with strong reforms of
scal, nancial and monetary policy, and a high pace of integration into the
world economy. This scenario is projected to yield a trend GDP growth of
8 per cent, thus capturing the `once in a lifetime' demographic opportunity
that is available to India today.
Even though the tax/GDP ratio in the second scenario is lower by 4 percent-
age points, over the next 10 or 20 years, the tax revenues of the State prove
to be signicantly higher. In addition, of course, citizens would prefer the
latter scenario given that personal incomes would be much higher over the
next 10 or 20 years by going down that route.
In summary, this paper emphasises the primary tool through which the State
can obtain resources is higher GDP growth. A tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent,
with expenditure that is just slightly above 20 per cent, is the reasonable
scenario which can be envisaged for the coming 30 years. Mobilising greater
resources for the State is thus synonymous with undertaking reforms which
yield higher GDP growth. Alongside this, a good part of the concerns which
lead to a desire for European-style social democracy can be addressed by un-
dertaking scal, nancial and monetary policy reforms through which busi-
ness cycle uctuations are diminished and governance vastly improved. In
addition, fresh thinking about mechanisms of expenditure can yield greater
bang for the buck thus freeing up resources while improving social justice
and welfare outcomes.
2 The role of the State in the new India
A large fraction of the Indian people lead a dicult life. A better functioning
State is of critical importance in improving the lives of the people, both
through its impact on everyday life through public goods, and through its
positive impact on GDP growth and growth in employment.
In terms of the central tasks of government, there is a broad consensus about
eight elements:
1. Eective legal protection and the justice system,
72. Defense and internal security
3. Elementary education,
4. Public goods that enable better health outcomes
5. Policy frameworks which reduce transactions costs,
6. Protection of the environment,
7. Macroeconomic risk reduction, and
8. Income transfers to people below the poverty line.
One of the key tasks that is faced in Indian economic reform is that of
fostering a State apparatus which can deliver these eight functions eciently,
with requisite resources being obtained in a non-distortionary manner.
Many in India aspire to additionally embark on two more functions: provid-
ing risk insurance to the population at large and undertaking population-wide
redistribution. It is argued that some advanced countries, such as Sweden,
perform these `social democracy' or `welfare state' functions relatively eec-
tively, and that Indian voters desire such an expansive State. In countries
like Sweden, the tax revenues of the government exceed half of GDP. This
agenda involves much more ambitious social engineering, where massive tax
revenues would have to be obtained, and politically directed towards certain
households through suitable government programs. In this paper, a resource
perspective is brought to bear upon these two distinct sets of objectives.
3 Living within our means
In recent months, television screens worldwide have highlighted the contrast
between Greece and Sweden. Both countries aspired towards constructing a
similar social democracy. While Sweden has been able to achieve stability,
Greece was living beyond its means. Political compulsions can often lead
to the enactment of ambitious social programs. However, as economists
emphasise, there is no free lunch, and when there is a gap between the
resources commanded by the State and the expenditure prole which has
been adopted, this can have devastating consequences.
The divergence between resources and expenditure-aspirations are met by
borrowing from citizens or from foreigners through nancial markets, result-
ing into growing indebtedness of the State. Financial markets often accept
8such slow increases in sovereign indebtedness upto a point. But at some point,
nancial markets can abruptly get extremely uncomfortable about solvency
of the government. Disruptive mistrust of solvency on the part of the nan-
cial markets often, unfortunately, coincides with political or economic crises,
thus exacerbating the diculties.
This `nonlinear' behaviour of nancial markets suggests that the present
relatively calm conditions should not induce complacency in Indian policy
thinking. It is important to be clearly in safe territory, amidst the ranks
of the scally healthy countries of the world, so as to rule out the scenario
of a sudden nancial crisis. In addition, the extent to which the country is
far removed from scal distress represents the headroom that is available for
scal expansion in the catastrophic situations that seem to arise in the global
economy once or twice a century.
3.1 Identifying the danger zone
The most important parameter which describes scal distress is the ratio of
government debt to GDP. Fiscal prudence involves ensuring (a) That this
ratio is not increasing and (b) That this ratio stays at reasonable levels.
It is useful to have a sense of what is the danger zone for the debt/GDP
ratio. While some OECD countries (e.g. Japan) have very high debt/GDP
ratios, the practical reality of being developing country is that debt tolerance
is lower. Government debt was below 60 per cent of GDP in most episodes
of default by governments in emerging economies in recent years (Reinhart,
Rogo, and Savastano, 2003).
India has some advantages on the outlook for debt owing to the hope of
attaining and sustaining high GDP growth. Yet, until India becomes a high-
income country, it is prudent to assume that nancial markets will be wary
about scal, nancial and monetary policy institutions in India, and will
become uncomfortable about owning Indian government bonds at high levels
of the debt/GDP ratio. The Indian rules about the debt/GDP ratio should
hence be calibrated based on emerging market experiences with default, and
not the experiences of countries like Japan which have sustained very high
levels of the debt/GDP ratio in recent years.
93.2 Impact of reducing the debt/GDP ratio upon growth
While large values for the debt/GDP ratio go along with enhanced crisis vul-
nerability, reductions in the debt/GDP ratio directly impinge upon growth.
A recent paper (Kumar and Woo, 2010) measures the direct contribution
of a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio upon growth, after controlling for a
diverse range of extraneous factors. They nd that on average, a 10 per-
centage points of GDP reduction in the debt/GDP ratio, by itself, adds 0.2
percentage points per year to GDP growth. The mechanism through which
this works is increased investment and increased productivity growth.
From an Indian perspective, this suggests that when the debt/GDP ratio is
brought down from the region of 90 per cent of GDP to the desirable target
of 60 per cent of GDP, this (by itself) would yield a rough acceleration in
growth of 0.6 per cent. In addition, the risk of a scal or nancial crisis
would be reduced, which is a prerequisite for a sustainable social democracy.
Fiscal prudence is thus good for growth in addition to being good for stability
(Feldstein, 2004).
3.3 Debt capacity as a reserve for extreme conditions
When a country has healthy values for debt and decits under ordinary
times, this creates the space through which the rare use of discretionary
scal policy can help the economy in rare and extreme events. The deeper
consequence of this scal space is that the private sector feels more condent
in the outlook for the country, knowing that the State has the capability to
marshall remarkable responses when extreme situations arise once or twice a
century. This condence induces bigger investments in nancial and human
capital and into long-term projects.
As an example, Table 1 looks at the experience with the consolidated decit
of the UK. From 1998 till 2007, the average value for the decit was 1.43%
of GDP. From 1999 till 2001, the scal balance was in surplus. In 2007, the
decit was at 2.6% of GDP.
In 2008, when the UK was hit by a once-in-a-century nancial crisis, this
healthy starting position gave the government the ability to undertake emer-
gency actions, which more than doubled the decit to 5.4% of GDP in 2008,
which went further to 9.8% of GDP in 2009 and is estimated to be 10.9% of
GDP in 2010. If the UK had not engaged in scal prudence from 1998 till
2007, with an average decit of 1.43% of GDP in this period, it would not
10Table 1 Decits in the UK
Year Consolidated Decit
1998 0.1
1999 -0.9
2000 -1.3
2001 -0.6
2002 1.9
2003 3.3
2004 3.3
2005 3.3
2006 2.6
2007 2.6
2008 5.4
2009 9.8
2010 10.9
have been possible to enlarge the decit in this fashion in response to the
once-in-a-century crisis.
A longer historical perspective on the UK, going back to the late 18th century,
shows a long-standing pattern where large decits were run and debt was
enlarged to deal with catastrophic events like wars. In normal times, for
decades on end, scal surpluses were obtained and used to pay o debt, thus
rebuilding the position for a next catastrophic event which might necessitate
borrowing. Such a framework gives scal policy the opportunity to respond
in extraordinary ways to the extraordinary events which take place once every
few decades.
This suggests that sound scal institutions should yield an equilibrium where,
in the typical year, the debt/GDP ratio goes down. This would create the
space for government to enlarge debt substantially once or twice a century
through discretionary scal policy, when catastrophic events come about.
At the same time, when these rare catastrophic events materialise, and gov-
ernments desire a substantial enlargement of the debt/GDP ratio, the bond
market is concerned about the possibility of insucient repayment through
ination. The willingness of the bond market to fund public debt in these
episodes is critically related to the extent to which such a scenario is ruled
out. An ination targeting central bank, which reassures the bond market
that unexpected ination will not arise, is an important component of the
institutional architecture that makes discretionary scal expansion possible
11without driving up interest rates.1
3.4 Feasibility of reduction of the debt/GDP ratio
If India starts out with a daunting value for the debt/GDP ratio, how dicult
is it to bring this down to the sub-60 zone of comfort? There is a somewhat
unexpected relationship between decits and debt. When decits are held
down to modest levels, and when GDP grows, the debt/GDP ratio comes
down quite dramatically.
As an example, the UK debt/GDP ratio dropped dramatically from 65% to
40% from 1996-97 to 2001-02. In other words, in a ve year period with only
modest surpluses, the debt/GDP ratio declined by 15 percentage points.2 In
similar fashion, the Canadian strategy of `budget balance or better' resulted
in a decline of the debt/GDP ratio from 70% in 1996 to 40% in 2004. These
examples show the feasibility of obtaining large reductions of the debt/GDP
ratio in relatively short periods of time, through a combination of the prudent
policy of running surpluses in normal times, alongside GDP growth which
increases the denominator.
Reductions of the debt/GDP ratio critically rely on the primary surplus
(the budgetary surplus calculated after excluding interest payments) and on
the GDP growth rate. When GDP growth is high, and when there are pri-
mary surpluses, rapid reductions in the debt/GDP ratio are feasible (Mundle,
Bhanumurthy, and Das, 2010). The former has been repeatedly achieved in
India, but the latter has not.
Table 2 shows some examples of developing countries which obtained strong
gains in the debt/GDP ratio in recent years. The average starting point
of these examples { a debt/GDP ratio of 80.7% { is coincidentally similar
to India's present starting point. Over an average ve-year period, in these
examples, the debt/GDP ratio was reduced by an impressive 26.1 percent-
age points. Of this, 10.6 percentage points came from the primary balance
(`PB'), 8.1 percentage points came from the gap between GDP growth and
the nominal interest rate, and 3 percentage points came from currency ap-
preciation. This gives us a rough sense of the contours of the composition
and scale of a strong scal correction, judged by the standards of developing
countries.
1See http://tinyurl.com/inflationfears on the web.
2Source: Debt and reserves management report, 2008-09 of the UK Debt Management
Oce.
12Table 2 Emerging markets which achieved strong reductions in the
debt/GDP ratio
Contribution
Episode Initial debt Reduction PB r   g Curr. apprec
Poland ('93-'98) 84.3 47.7 3.3 22.6 9.6
Chile ('90-'98) 45.9 33.0 30.0 11.5 3.9
Ecuador ('88-'90) 113.5 32.1 4.1 11.4 -11.8
Pakistan ('01-'07) 84.8 29.7 6.4 17.1 5.1
Egypt ('03-'07) 114.9 27.7 -11.0 29.9 1.9
Jamaica ('02-'07) 122.0 27.4 50.8 -30.3 3.8
Brazil ('02-'05) 85.0 20.8 12.4 1.7 4.6
Colombia ('02-'07) 49.8 16.4 14.4 1.0 4.6
Malaysia ('03-'07) 44.4 14.5 -4.3 8.3 2.4
Tunisia ('01-'07) 62.7 11.8 -0.7 8.1 6.4
Average 80.7 26.1 10.6 8.1 3.0
Source: Table 6.3 from Fiscal implications of the global economic
and nancial crisis, IMF Sta Position Note, 9 June 2009, SPN
09/13.
A modest literature has now sprung up on understanding the enabling con-
ditions (on an international scale) for large debt reductions, of the kind that
are now needed in India. A recent contribution to this eld is Nickel, Rother,
and Zimmermann (2010). They nd that over 1985-2009, many events of to-
tal debt reduction averaging 37 percentage points of GDP can be identied,
across the world. This encourages us about the feasibility of the quest for
large debt reduction in India. Under what conditions do such large debt
reductions materialise? They identify two key factors. The rst is an envi-
ronment of high GDP growth. India satises this requirement. The second
requirement, in their words, is:
\decisive and lasting (rather than timid and short-lived) s-
cal consolidation eorts focused on reducing government expen-
diture, in particular, cuts in social benets and public wages."
This suggests the area of focus for policy today.
3.5 Summary
India has a long history of scal indiscipline (Buiter and Patel, 1992). Hence,
the scal problem requires particular focus. Any plans for expenditure by
13Table 3 Central government's scal stance
(Percent to GDP)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Receipts 15.6 14.2 13.5 15.0 15.1 16.5 15.9
Expenditure (ex. interest) 11.5 10.1 10.1 11.0 12.4 12.9 12.3
Interest payment 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6
Expenditure 15.4 13.7 13.6 14.5 15.9 16.4 15.9
Primary surplus 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.9 -2.6 -3.1 -1.9
Stock of debt 61.6 61.0 59.3 57.3 56.7 56.4 56.5
the State must stay within the budget constraints of taxation. This, in turn,
translates into one tangible goal and one intermediate test.
The tangible goal is that the government's debt (fully measured) must not
be increasing through time and must not cross 60% of GDP.
The intermediate test is that every year, India must run primary surpluses.
That is, there must be a scal surplus once interest payments are excluded.
In good years, there should be strong scal surpluses, and in bad years,
the scal surplus can dwindle away to zero. Once this intermediate test is
satised, under ordinary circumstances, the Indian debt/GDP ratio would
decline from year to year. This would create the space for enlargement of
the debt/GDP ratio when faced with exceptional situations. However, Table
3 shows these key calculations for the central government in recent years,
which shows that we are far from this required conguration. These years
had India's greatest ever business cycle expansion.
The recently submitted Finance Commission report has outlined a feasible
path of scal consolidation which will reverse this trend. The Finance Com-
mission has shown that under the proposed Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act (FRBM Act) framework, the consolidated debt/GDP ra-
tio would decline from 80.7% to 68% in next 5 years. Such a reduction in
debt/GDP ratio should be considered as a minimum achievable target, since
these calculations have assumed a rather modest growth path for the econ-
omy. With energetic implementation of tax and expenditure reforms, the
growth performance of the economy can be even better and consequently the
reduction in debt/GDP ratio can improve upon these projections.
144 How can resources be obtained?
Once a sound set of rules are in place governing borrowing, the expenses
of a government are largely circumscribed by its revenues. Modications in
tax policy can yield greater tax revenues. In addition, there are also some
important opportunities for obtaining resources from non-tax channels.
4.1 Architecture of the tax system
The simple channel { higher tax rates { involves two problems. The rst is
that of tax evasion. Higher tax rates inspire greater eorts at evasion. This
matters directly insofar as an increase in the tax rate fails to yield the hoped-
for tax revenues. More importantly, high tax rates induce citizens and rms
to undertake far-reaching re-organisation of business and personal life so as
to evade taxes. This sets the stage for deeper problems for law enforcement
and for the political system. It is, hence, important to avoid high tax rates.
The second problem is that of economic distortions. High tax rates distort
behaviour and the organisation of production. Economic analysis shows that
the distortion associated with a tax rate goes up with the square of the rate.
Higher tax rates produce much larger distortions. These distortions adversely
aect the foundations of economic growth. Since economic growth is the only
robust foundation of poverty alleviation, and given that the very resource
base of the State is linked to GDP, these distortions are worth avoiding.
In thinking about tax policy, the ideal channel is one where reforms of tax
policy are undertaken which yield higher tax revenues by increasing eciency
and thus GDP, and by building mechanisms for obtaining tax revenues which
are very hard to evade. Our strategic thinking about the tax system should
be grounded on three big ideas:
Fiscal rules As emphasised above, government must live within its means. Tax
revenues must dene expenditure aspirations.
The criticality of growth Once we have a commitment to live within our means,
growth in expenditure can, then, only be achieved through growth in GDP.
The tax system is an important part of the determinants of GDP growth.
A well designed tax system is one which would be compatible with high
incentives to save and invest, to organise production eciently and achieve
high growth. This is the path to achieving large values for the absolute size
of resources of the exchequer.
15Table 4 The opportunity for tax revenues
Range of per capita GDP Tax revenue (Per cent to GDP)
Below $745 14.1
$745 { $2975 16.7
$2976 { $9205 20.2
All developing 17.6
Above $9206 25.0
A sense of the possible Using modern computer technology, tax revenues can
and should improve. Systems such as the `Tax Information Network' can
have a major impact upon tax collections. But India cannot aspire to West-
ern European style tax/GDP ratios. The cross-country evidence shows that
until $10,000 of per capita GDP, there is only a modest rise in the tax/GDP
ratio. Table 4, drawn from Gordon and Li (2009), shows the striking em-
pirical regularities on this subject. This suggests that till India achieves
per capita income of $9,206, tax revenues of all levels of government put
together, are unlikely to go much beyond 18-20% of GDP. The task is, then,
one of using these revenues eectively to get beyond $9,206 of per capita
GDP, after which bigger opportunities would become visible.
4.2 Elements of Indian reform of tax policy
Within this strategic perspective, seven big ideas should now shape our think-
ing about tax policy.
1. GST Ten years ago, our scal experts felt that a well structured Goods and
Services Tax in India was infeasible. Gradually, this pessimism has eased.
The automation of income tax showed that India can build IT systems;
the State VAT eort showed that coordination between states could happen
(Rao, 2005; Kelkar, 2004).
Done right, the GST will be accompanied by removing almost all other ex-
isting taxes, leaving only three taxes: the income tax, the GST and the
property tax. This will reduce compliance costs, economic distortions and
harassment. Many of the taxes that would be removed are `bad taxes' on
turnover such as the stamp duty or octroi. This policy package has been
termed the `Model GST': single rate GST that covers all Goods and Ser-
vices, which replaces all indirect taxes of the Centre and States, with a a
harmonized exemption list, and a common IT platform.
The GST will enable the next phase of customs or import tari reform. The
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and exports are refunded the full GST. By this arrangement, local rms face
fair competition in both the domestic market and the global market.
The GST would unleash India as a common market. Even though India is a
giant economy with a GDP of $1.25 trillion, Indian rms often operate within
one state. Nationwide optimisation of production, storage and logistics is
not taking place. The GST would make possible productivity gain, GDP
growth and lower prices.
When market forces govern behaviour, rms gravitate towards low-cost pro-
duction centres. A rm that sells in Gujarat might setup a factory in Madhya
Pradesh. But this evolution - which tends to reduce inter-state disparities
- is blocked by barriers to movement of goods. The GST would promote
growth of lagging regions; in particular, poor states adjoining rich states
will obtain sharply increased investment.
Global manufacturing now involves a large number of processes, spread
across many rms in many countries. India has not been able to achieve
Chinese-style employment-generation in manufacturing partly because of the
burden of cascading taxes. GST will make India a competitor in Chinese-
style manufacturing and employment, and set the stage for a great boom in
employment-intensive and FDI-intensive manufacturing exports.
One of the major impacts of GST will be on the Construction Sector. Bring-
ing real estate into the GST will have many benecial eects. It will reduce
housing costs, improve the working of the land market and greatly reduce
the `black economy' alongside yielding improvements in governance in the
urban and semi-urban areas (through visibility of real estate prices and thus
the establishment of a tax base for the property tax).
Many economists have argued that achieving the `Model GST' is the most
important single reform in Indian economic policy. A recent NCAER study
has estimated the impact of the GST upon GDP. They nd that the eco-
nomic value of the `model GST' reform will exceed $0.5 trillion (Chadha,
2010).
There are four stepping stones to a functioning GST:
1. The rst task concerns IT systems. The Tax Information Network
(TIN) system is the right foundation for implementing the GST. TDS
in an employer/employee context is exactly the same as GST in a
supplier/purchaser context. Since TIN does TDS, it is ideally placed
to also do the GST. TIN already reaches 700,000 establishments. IT
development work needs to be initiated at NSDL, for enlarging the
TIN to do GST for the identical 700,000 establishments.
2. The rst test case for the new IT system should be a merger between
CENVAT, the Service Tax and VAT on imports (i.e. CVD) into a
17single tax called the Central GST.
3. The next task is that of arriving at a `grand bargain' with states. The
most fair formulation involves placing the entire GST collection into
the hands of the Finance Commission for sharing with States. As
all commentators have emphasised, a piecemeal allocation of certain
services for taxation by States will derail the possibility of such an
agreement. The fair deal that States should be oered is one where
they tax all services, in return for cooperation in the administration of
the GST, and removal of distortionary taxes.
4. The last task is that of coordinating tax administration with the states.
Each rm should face only one tax man, and all rms should face the
same IT system. One possibility is that of using the centre as tax
collector for big rms and the state as tax collector for small rms.
2. A third of India paying personal income tax The fundamental feature of
the social contract between citizens and State is one where citizens pay tax
and the State delivers public goods. On both fronts { the extent to which
citizens are law-abiding and pay taxes, and the extent to which the State
actually delivers public goods { there are severe collective action and prin-
cipal/agent problems.
A tax system where a large fraction of households pay income tax, albeit
at a low rate, is one in which a large number of citizens would be more
demanding about public service delivery. A tax payer is likely to demand
public services as a matter of right, and is less likely to be a supplicant.
The overall performance of the economy is enhanced when the tax rate is
low and tax payments are dispersed across a large number of households.
High tax rates generate heightened eorts on evasion, and large economic
distortions.
In the coming decade, a reasonable outcome would be one where 33% of
India's households pay income tax. CMIE household survey data (Dec 2009)
shows that this is a cuto of Rs.45,000 of household income. A simplied
at tax of 10% can be employed for household incomes from Rs.50,000 till
Rs.100,000 per year. Higher tax rates, and a more complex tax code, can
kick in from incomes of above Rs.100,000 per year.
Through the years, as this cuto of Rs.50,000 is held intact, a bigger fraction
of the population would fall into the income tax system through bracket
creep, thus generating a larger participation by the people into a government
that should work for the people.
3. Import Tari Regime India has beneted enormously from the opening up
to the international trade. The average import tari or customs collection
are now at single digit levels and it is now time to move forward towards
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Such a policy will also enable India to pursue a \Zero for Zero" option
at WTO trade negotiations and, thus, strengthen the multi-lateral trading
system in which India, as a rising trading nation, has great stakes. The tari
policy governing agriculture sector will require a separate and more nuanced
treatment. This zero import tari will be accompanied by the full force of
GST on imports. This will give a level playing eld to our industry.
4. Taxation of capital Taxation of capital income has long been seen as some-
thing that stands symmetrically alongside taxation of labour income. It is
often felt that the capital gains tax should be similar to the income tax on
wage income. However, both need to be seen in a unied perspective: one
of fostering high GDP growth in the long run.
A central source of high GDP growth in the long run in a poor country
like India is growth of capital stock. A poor country has to save and in-
vest, to build up the capital stock. This `deepening of capital' increases the
productivity of labour and underpins the expansion of labour income.
Fairly modest changes in the annual savings rate translate into an elevated
trajectory of per capita income over long periods of time. Conversely, if
ve years elapse at a lower investment rate (e.g. owing to a period where
tax policy incentivised consumption), then this permanently depresses the
future trajectory of capital and thus per capita GDP.
The question that should be posed of tax policy is: How can the tax code be
structured to foster a high rate of savings and investment? Once seen in this
perspective, taxation of capital income is shown in poor light. Many projects
which have a positive net present value (NPV) in a world without taxation
are tipped into the zone of negative NPV once some cashows are paid to
the government (at future dates) as taxation of capital income. Hence, the
introduction of taxation of capital income into an undistorted world leads
to fewer projects being undertaken. It reduces the pace of capital deepening
in the economy, and reduces the long-term growth of the country.
As an example, a prominent recent review, which summarises the lessons
obtained from 50 years of research in optimal taxation policy (Mankiw,
Weinzierl, and Yagan, 2009) identies Lesson 7: Capital Income Ought To
Be Untaxed, At Least in Expectation. As they say:
\...the logic for low capital taxes is powerful: the supply of
capital is highly elastic, capital taxes yield large distortions to in-
tertemporal consumption plans and discourage saving, and capi-
tal accumulation is central to the aggregate output of the econ-
omy."
Going beyond the individual perspective, the behaviour of corporations also
changes when there is a capital gains tax. Without a capital gains tax,
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prots. The rule that is prescribed to companies is that when a rm has
internal projects that will yield a return on equity that is higher than in-
vesting in the market index, then the dividend payout ratio should be zero,
otherwise it should be 100%.
When capital gains are taxed, rms have a tax-related incentive to payout
more dividends. This reduces the savings of corporations and hinders their
capital deepening.
A unied and symmetric solution to the treatment of labour and capital
income is the Exempt-Exempt-Tax (EET) system of taxation. Under this,
the income of a person (from any source) that is used for investment is de-
ductible. Further, reinvestment is exempt from taxation. It is only upon
exit, where money is taken out of investments for the purpose of consump-
tion, that these withdrawals are treated as ordinary income, and taxed as
ordinary income.
The key insight here is to encourage and support saving and reinvestment.
So when a person takes labour or capital income and puts it into invest-
ments, this part should be tax-exempt. Further, when securities are sold
and reinvested, the capital income should also be tax-exempt. This gives
strong incentives for capital deepening in the economy. It is when the person
liquidates assets and brings money into consumption that two taxes should
come into play: the long-term capital gains tax that is paid on money that
comes out of an EET system, and the GST that is paid on consumption
goods purchased.
This approach requires scaling up the EET system to go from the present
vision, of a few lakh rupees per person in the context of long-term savings, to
cover all nancial activities of citizens. Systems like the NSDL's Tax Infor-
mation Network (TIN) can be designed to track a comprehensive portfolio
of each individual, whereby sale of assets and reinvestment is tax exempt,
but exit from the EET track is subject to the long-term capital gains tax.
5. Fundamental rethink of taxing corporations In any country, production
can be organised through clubs, associations, partnerships, limited liability
corporations, etc. All these structures are a means to an end: they result
in personal income for individuals involved in the production process. That
personal income would be taxed in a well designed income tax system. As
a consequence, the taxation of any organisational form constitutes double
taxation.
The taxation of corporations induces two kinds of eects. First, there is
a distortionary bias in favour of tax-ecient organisational structures such
as proprieterships or partnerships. If a certain kind of production is best
organised as a limited liability corporation, then the productivity of the
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an alternative organisational structure.
The second problem is that of locating production outside the country. In
the European Union, the average value for the corporate tax in 2009 was 23.5
per cent: a reduction of 11.8 percentage points from the level of 35.3 per cent
in 1995. This portrays the average: many countries have a corporate tax
rate of below 23.5 per cent. Many developing countries, of course, have lower
rates than those seen in the EU. India stands out as a high tax location, with
an eective marginal rate of 33.99% for domestic companies and 41.2% for
foreign companies. To the extent that India is a high corporate tax region,
there is a greater bias in the favour of both Indian and foreign companies to
avoid investment in India.
There is a broad consensus that the Indian marginal tax rate on corporations
should not exceed that prevalent with other developing countries, which
suggests a value such as 20 per cent. But there is a strong case for going
further, and eliminating the corporation tax altogether.3
This would yield three direct benets. First, it would eliminate the com-
pliance costs at both corporations and government in the administration
of corporation tax. Second, it would bring India to prominence in the in-
vestment planning of Indian and global rms. Third, it would remove the
tax-induced bias in favour of debt nancing for rms, thus reducing the ex-
tent of leveraging and thus risk taking. By reducing the demands for debt
by large rms, greater space would be freed up in for bank borrowing by
small and medium enterprises (SME).
When corporate income ows through to shareholders, it would be taxed
as ordinary income. The increased resources of corporations would also
generate increased employment, at which point increased ows of income
tax would be obtained. Through this, the income of corporations would
be fully taxed once { in the hands of the individuals associated with the
corporation (shareholders and workers).
The residual problem with this strategy is the possibility that corporations
might choose to not pay out dividends for extended periods of time. This can
be avoided by having rules about a minimum dividend payout every year. At
the polar case, it is possible to envisage a world where the entire prot is re-
quired to be paid out as dividends. This would ow through to shareholders
and be taxed as ordinary income in their hands. Investment activities of the
rm would take place through rights issues and external nance (both debt
and public issues). This would have the additional advantage of improv-
ing corporate governance, by requiring that managers justify all investment
plans to shareholders.
3A paper-length treatment of this proposal is presently under development.
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on their prot is that it will vastly reduce the lobbying or rent seeking be-
haviour by the Corporate sector as there will be no tax benets to obtain!
This will help preserve a healthy distance between business and politics.
Corporate lobbying has been one of the contributors to the creeping `crony
capitalism' and consequent diculties of governance in India. Improvements
in governance are of essence for India in the coming generation, and the elim-
ination of the corporation tax will be one element assisting that governance
transformation.
An important objection to this proposal is that no other country has a
Zero Corporate tax rate. But then, there is no country in the world other
than India which has a possibility to register double digit growth rate in
coming two to three decades. We must radically rethink our policies so
as to exploit this opportunity, so as to decisively break with the curse of
poverty. The rapid removal of poverty requires miracle growth rates, as was
done in China. This would crucially depend on increased investments and
improved governance. The policy of Zero Corporate tax with full taxability
of dividends and capital gains in the hands of recipients will greatly facilitate
achieving such a growth turnpike.
6. Residence based taxation of nance A core principle guiding discussions
on tax policy and globalisation is that taxation should not generate distor-
tions which inuence the economic decisions of individuals or rms. Taxation
should be neutral and neither generate a bias in favour of doing business at
home nor a bias in favour of doing business abroad.
Tax neutrality as regards trade in goods and services has been achieved
by focusing taxation purely upon the point of consumption through the
destination principle. Under the VAT system, a British consumer of an
Australian shirt only pays VAT in Britain. The global market for shirts is
fully competitive: all high seas prices are free of taxation. The VAT system
actively participates in the process of achieving neutrality, by refunding the
entire burden of domestic taxation that was faced by the exporter. Critics
of the VAT have sometimes termed this `subsidising foreign customers at
the expense of domestic customers', which is of course an erroneous charac-
terisation. This approach of focusing taxation upon residents has delivered
high levels of current account integration in the world economy without
tax-induced distortions of behaviour.
Similar issues arise in the treatment of capital account integration. In order
to achieve tax neutrality, the strategy which has been adopted worldwide is
to have `residence based taxation' (Sinha, 2010). A country taxes the global
nancial income of residents but exempts all income of non-residents. Critics
of residence-based taxation in nance have sometimes termed this `subsidis-
ing foreign nancial players at the expense of domestic ones', which is of
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the global market for nancial services is undistorted by tax considerations
to the extent that the investor does not have to take into account the tax
regime of the source country. The British buyer of an Australian nan-
cial product only pays income tax in the UK. This delivers the end result
of global competition and freedom of choice. The UK tax authorities tax
the global nancial services income of UK residents and the Australian tax
authorities tax the global nancial services income of Australian residents.
India has a de facto residence based taxation system through the Mauritius
route. Foreign investors route their capital ows to India through Mauritius,
and are thus immunised from domestic taxation, while local tax authorities
tax the global income of residents. The construction of a rational tax frame-
work requires shifting this from de facto to de jure, by giving all non-residents
the Mauritius treatment.
There are concerns about entering into tax treaties with residence-based
taxation when dealing with capital inows from tax havens. In the long
run, relatively complex tax policy needs to be crafted in order to deal with
the issues associated with tax havens. In the short run, it is immediately
feasible for India to enter into reciprocal residence-based tax treaties with
all countries who are members of the oecd, none of which are tax havens,
and all of which have high quality governance.
7. Estate duty Alongside this framework, there is a case for a modest level of
estate duty on wealth holders beyond inheritances of Rs.50 crore. This
would generate certain scal revenues without inducing signicant distor-
tions. Such an estate duty will also play an important role to improve inter-
generational equity and to promote philanthropy, while preserving incentive-
compatibility on the core business of savings and investment through the
working life of each person.
To sum up, over the next few years, we need to head towards a tax regime
with zero import taris, zero tax on corporations (with rules about paying
out prots to shareholders so that income tax is applied there), a `Model
GST' which is essentially a consumption tax, and a small estate duty.
These seven directions of policy will yield a tax system which is compatible
with high GDP growth by encouraging integration with the world economy,
by encouraging savings and investment, by generating low distortions in the
economy, and by encouraging ecient organisation of production. It is not
dicult to show that with our proposed tax reforms, the Indian Tax Sys-
tem will become more equitable than the current one. All this would yield
high and sustained GDP growth, which is the only long-term foundation of
resources for the State. The ideal scenario which we should aspire for is
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unchanged tax/GDP ratio yield a 12% nominal growth in tax revenues year
after year. Under these conditions, tax revenues would double every 9 years
in real terms through sheer GDP growth.
In this scenario, the tax base of local bodies will essentially consist of tax on
properties and a share in GST. As introduction of the model GST implies
elimination of distorting taxes such as entry tax, octroi, etc., the local bodies
will require a commensurate share in the GST tax collection.
All seven areas involve questions of transition. In the short term, decits
may rise. These reforms have many implications for the fairness of resource
sharing with the states. Technical studies need to be undertaken on esti-
mating the magnitudes of these eects, and nding transition mechanisms
to smooth the short-run eects.
4.3 Non-tax sources of resources
The Indian State possesses a large stock of assets, particularly in the form of
shares of PSUs and land. There is a need for a strategic perspective on the
portfolio composition of these assets.4
Budget constraints are a harsh reality of life. Ultimately, there is a budget
constraint in terms of the overall assets of the State. When the State chooses
to own Rs.1 of something, this comes at the cost of owning Rs.1 of something
else.
The interesting and important question that we should all be asking ourselves
is: What should the portfolio composition of the government be? What assets
should be held by the State?
The portfolio composition of the State is not something that should remain
static at all times. A few decades ago, India was in a very dierent set-
ting. After independence, the Bombay Plan was drafted by the business
community. It envisaged government investment in capital-intensive and
technologically-complex problems of the time, such as production of steel or
electricity. In the 1970s, the argument was made that if the government did
not run an airline, then the private sector could not. By 2010, conditions
have changed considerably.
Most of us would agree that the airline industry works quite well as a purely
4This treatment draws upon Kelkar (2010).
24private aair. All over the world, governments have got out of airlines. The
decades of losses and poor performance of Alitalia is commonly held up as an
example of what goes wrong when a rm is brought under public ownership.
At the opposite end, most of us would agree that rural roads have to be on
the balance sheet of the State. These roads typically do not have adequate
trac, and tolling would not generate adequate revenues. If the government
did not own rural roads, these roads would not exist. Similarly, a signicant
fraction of the stock of capital involved in public health in our cities will need
to be owned by the government. Equally, the preservation and improvement
of forest cover will have to be a new priority for the public sector assets.
So there is a spectrum of assets, ranging from airlines to rural roads, where
government ownership is inadvisable for airlines but required for rural roads
or public health infrastructure. How should we think about where each
problem falls? There are two broad categories with considerable clarity:
Goods and services in ordinary competitive markets The rst area where
we have a good understanding is goods and services on ordinary competitive
markets. An example is steel. Now that India has near-zero taris on
steel, it is a globally competitive market. Many private companies produce
steel. The old argument - about capital and technology required for steel
companies being out of reach for the private sector - is no longer convincing.
We are now seeing Indian rms exporting steel into the global market - which
demonstrates that there is no gap in technology. And, we are also seeing
Indian companies turning into multinationals and buying up global steel
companies - which demonstrates that there is no gap in capital availability
for Indian companies.
Under these conditions, private ownership works best. This should be seen
at dierent levels. First, under ordinary circumstances, private ownership
generates the best incentives for cost-minimisation, innovation, and dynamic
adjustment of corporate strategy. This is not an ideological position. An
extensive research literature has examined privatisation experiences from all
across the world, and the ndings suggest big gains in productivity from
private ownership.
The second aspect of public versus private ownership concerns the issues
that arise when a company approaches bankruptcy. In the private sector,
bankruptcy is taken seriously. The fear of bankruptcy generates drastic
responses in terms of selling o parts of the company, modifying business
strategy, etc. These are healthy responses from the viewpoint of the econ-
omy. When an unhealthy company sells o a factory to a strong company,
the control of assets of the economy moves into the best hands.
Output and employment are optimised through these adjustments. In con-
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about the prospect of bankruptcy. Drastic adjustments when faced with ex-
tinction do not take place, because the managers know that there is no real
danger of extinction. Public sector companies are always able to draw on
the taxpayer to pay for losses. So there are two problems. Adjustments do
not take place because of the lack of fear of extinction, and the taxpayer
suers from periodic claims on resources every time the company gets into
trouble. There is also a deeper problem here. If in the market place, one of
the participants like a PSU is operating under a `soft budget constraint' and
that too with deep pockets, then it can adversely aect the performance and
fortunes of even ecient private sector companies operating in that sector
and such a market structure will systematically misallocate resources.
In regulated industries The second area where private ownership is clearly de-
sirable is in regulated industries. In India, we are now seeing numerous
regulated industries, ranging from nance to infrastructure, where a gov-
ernment agency performs the function of regulation and multiple competing
rms are located in the private sector. Here, the simple and clean solution
{ government as the umpire and the private sector as the players { is what
works best. This conguration is used in every advanced country, and we in
India also face the challenge of setting up this architecture of government as
regulator with massive investment coming in from the private sector which
builds multiple competing rms.
In many of these industries, we have a legacy of government ownership either
directly by government departments or in the form of PSUs. The problems
described above are very much there: productivity tends to be lower in pub-
lic sector companies, the fear of bankruptcy is absent, and the risk of asking
for money from the taxpayer is ever present. There is an additional issue.
This is the conict of interest between government as an owner and govern-
ment as the regulator. For instance, the formulation and implementation
of competition policy will be more vigorous and fair if government compa-
nies are not in the picture. One example is the recent measures taken by
the government to support Air India: many of these can be construed as
anti-competitive as these vitiate the playing eld for our private airlines.
India's future lies in building a new institutional architecture with govern-
ment as regulator and with the private sector doing investment. There is a
problem when the government is conicted. If the private sector feels that
the regulator will not be an unbiased umpire in the competitive process,
because a ward of the government is one of the players, then this makes the
private sector feel uncomfortable. In the eyes of the private sector, this is
a political risk. To pay for higher risk, the private sector demands a higher
return. Fewer projects are implemented: the magnitude of investment goes
down. With a higher rate of return on capital demanded by the private
26sector, user charges go up.
If we think of the next 25 years, a very substantial portion of the investment
in all regulated industries in India is going to come from the private sector.
It would be myopic for the government to have a regulator who is conicted,
which reduces the quantum of investment and drive up user charges. It
makes more sense for the government to reorganise itself, shifting into the
role of the umpire and away from the role of the player. We must move
towards a clean solution: government as an umpire and the private sector
as players.
There are other areas where there are shades of grey or complexities. For
instance, natural resource based industries such as upstream hydrocarbons
sector are a complex question. Here, there is a strategic issue as well as the
issue of optimal appropriation of the underlying vast resource rent. Similarly,
the role of government vis-a-vis universities is also complex. Barring a few
such gray areas, we can condently set about reformulating the activities of
the State in the following two key areas. Firstly, the State should not be
producing things which can be produced in competitive markets: this covers
areas like steel or aluminium or cars. And secondly, the State should not
be a player in regulated industries: this covers areas like airlines, running
railway trains, shipping, telecom, banking or insurance.
A useful way to visualise this is essentially as a balance sheet adjustment.
Suppose the government undertakes a portfolio adjustment, where Rs.10,000
crore of shares of Air India is sold and used to build 2000 kilometres of
highways. Let us trace through the full implications of this. Even if Rs.10,000
crore of shares of Air India constitute a minority sale (i.e. `disinvestment' in
the Indian jargon), then certain eciency gains are obtained. We now have
our own Indian empirical evidence which shows that the mere act of listing
induces improved productivity. Four channels seem to be at work: listing
induces increased transparency, the stock market brings pressure on senior
managers by doing daily performance evaluation, corporate governance is
typically improved after listing, and to the extent that employees are given
some shares, they become more aligned towards the growth and success of
the organisation.
If Rs.10,000 crore of shares of Air India constitutes a majority sale (i.e. `pri-
vatisation') then even bigger eciency gains are obtained. Extensive interna-
tional evidence shows that productivity goes up strongly after privatisation.
The increase in India's GDP because of a better run Air India is the rst
gain from the proposed portfolio adjustment. The second gain from the pro-
posed portfolio adjustment lies in obtaining an additional 2000 kilometres
27of highway. The benets for India of this public asset are simply enormous.
The 2000 km. of highway that we do not have is the opportunity cost that
we suer every year owing to an investment of Rs.10,000 crore in Air India.
It would make a lot of sense for India to undertake this portfolio adjustment
of public sector assets to switch from owning Air India to owning highways
or public health infrastructure or augmenting `environmental capital'. The
full picture should be seen. The motivation for disinvestment or privatisation
should not be narrowly seen as being only about maximising the proceeds
from the sale of assets. The real big gains come from the full picture. We gain
when the private sector obtains higher productivity (and this happens even
with mere disinvestment, but it happens much more strongly with privatisa-
tion). We gain when the private sector becomes more comfortable bringing
capital into investing in India in regulated industries. And, we gain when
the government is able to build highways and canals, metro systems and
railroad, which are crucial for India's growth and legitimately belong on the
government's balance sheet.
Over the years, the size of the public sector has increased in our economy
and currently, there are 473 central PSUs including banks and insurance
companies. Of these, 104 are listed and 369 are unlisted. At the State level,
there are 1160 State PSUs. It is estimated by informed nancial analysts that
the valuation of central PSUs (on a P/E basis for the listed companies and
P/B basis for unlisted companies) can work out to roughly 500-600 billion
dollars or 40-45 per cent of GDP. These are very substantial resources which
would become available to the Government to unburden itself of debt thus
freeing up scal space, and to pursue its own legitimate expenditure goals.
One area of concern about privatisation lies in its political consequences.
If PSUs are auctioned o, many of them would be purchased by the top
100 business houses of the country today. This would lead to a further
increase in their economic and political inuence in the country. In addition,
in many regulated industries, there are concerns about the possibility of
corruption when prot-maximising rms interact with weak governance. The
strategy which addresses these concerns is one in which the shares of PSUs
are dispersed across the wide investor community, and the rm is run by
professional managers. Such rms, examples of which include L&T or HDFC,
are controlled by no family or business house.
285 Intelligent design of government programs
There is widespread discomfort with the ineciency of government expendi-
ture programs in India. A recent paper (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009)
proposes a useful distinction between `active' and `passive' waste by govern-
ment. Active waste generates private benets for politicians and bureacrats
while passive waste does not. In India, there is a strong focus on the former.
As an example, a recent article5 estimates that a government of the size of
the State government of Karnataka yields Rs.3,000 crore of bribes per year.
Scaled up to the level of India as a whole, this suggests a very large scale of
ows of money through corruption.
Corruption represents an immense roadblock to the prospect of achieving an
eective government. Controlling corruption is a moral imperative. However,
Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009) harness a fascinating dataset and esti-
mate that of the total waste in government programs, 83 per cent is passive
waste. That is, in an OECD country, the elimination of corruption would
only eliminate 17 per cent of the overall waste. Further, corruption control
might often require overheads which further increase passive waste.
The challenge, then, in obtaining an eective government is that of nding
mechanisms of public administration through which both passive waste and
active waste are controlled. This is a truly daunting challenge in India.
In addition to the `active waste' which is prominent in policy thinking in
India, where there is a strong attention upon corruption, there is also a big
problem of `passive waste' that needs to be confronted. Until far-reaching
new ideas are implemented on these questions, spending more money on
public programs is often futile.
5.1 Envisioning European-style social democracy in the
Indian setting
European-style social democracy involves the establishment of large-scale
population-wide programs which directly address risks faced by individuals
and which undertake redistribution. But building a large State, beyond
the minimalist functions of a `watchman' State, involves solving complex
problems of collective action. Social norms are required that prevent a small
number of citizens from exploiting the welfare state, which would result in
5Government, a lucrative business by Vivek Kulkarni, in Hindu Business Line, 28
October 2010.
29Table 5 Trust capital: a cross-country perspective
Rank Country Agree that most people can be trusted
Overall University grads
1 China 52.3 70.1
2 United States 39.3 43.2
3 Japan 39.1 46.9
4 Germany 36.8 48.8
5 UK 30.5 42.0
6 South Korea 28.2 38.0
7 Russia 26.2 29.7
8 India 23.3 21.4
9 South Africa 18.8 23.5
10 Brazil 9.4 18.8
11 Turkey 4.9 4.5
Source: World Values Survey, 2006/2007.
exploding public expenditures. Political scientists have long emphasised the
greater feasibility of of establishing a welfare state when a country has low
heterogeneity and high social capital.
When a country is homogeneous, voters believe that social programs bene-
t people like them. India has very high levels of heterogeneity by ethnicity,
religion, language, and class. The analysis of size of government across devel-
oping countries and across time by Shonchoy (2010) shows that on average,
a one standard deviation increase in linguistic fractionalisation is associated
with a decrease of expenditure to GDP by 1.07 percentage points. India has
one of the most extreme levels of linguistic fractionalisation, which would
tend go along with a smaller State.
A related issue is that of trust capital, or the extent to which individuals in
a country agree with the statement `Most people can be trusted'.
Cross-country data from the World Values Survey for 2006/2007 is shown
in Table 5. Among major countries, China stands out as a country with
high trust capital: 52.3% of the overall population believes that most people
can be trusted. India has much less trust capital, with only 23.3% of the
population feeling similarly trusting.
It is useful to focus upon attitudes among university graduates since this
gives a sense about how things might evolve in the future with the spread
of university education. University graduates are generally more trusting: in
China's case the proportion of the trusting goes up to 70.1% when considering
university graduates only. In India's case, only 21.4% of university graduates
30believe that most people can be trusted. Only Brazil and Turkey have less
trust capital amongst university graduates than India.
In recent work, Bergh and Bjornskov (2010) oer empirical evidence which
emphasises a causal connection between trust capital and the welfare state.
They conjecture three mechanisms through which high trust levels increase
the feasibility of social democracy:
1. Social programs are, by denition, available to all. With low trust capital,
individuals are more likely to free ride on the system to the maximal extent,
leading to exploding costs.
2. A key dimension of trust is trust in the bureaucracy. When trust capi-
tal is low, bureacrats cannot be trusted with discretionary power, which
makes it more dicult to build and implement universal welfare policies.
European-style social democracy involves case workers interacting with poor
families, making discretionary decisions. This requires building and running
large transaction-intensive discretionary programs, which present the hard-
est problems in public administration (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004).
3. Finally, large welfare programs require a high tax/GDP ratio. In high trust
societies, tax compliance would not deteriorate and a large underground
economy would not develop.
Trust capital evolves only slowly over the decades. Hence, for the coming
few decades, we have to work within the existing environment, where India
is a highly diverse society, where voters are likely to think that the people
beneting from a welfare program are unlike themselves, where trust is low,
and where civil servants cannot be trusted with discretion in the operation
of welfare programs.
From a resource perspective, trust capital matters in thinking about welfare
programs in two respects. First, with low trust capital, citizens are likely to
engage in strategic behaviour and maximally exploit the provisions of welfare
programs, thus exacerbating their cost. In addition, with low trust capital,
a high tax/GDP ratio is likely to be elusive.
5.2 Sophisticated thinking with incentive-compatible
programs
Given a budget of the tax revenues of the State, high eciency in provision
of public goods and in operations of poverty programs is supremely impor-
tant. A key dimension which needs to be brought into the process of design
31and renement of government expenditure is the power of incentives. The
behaviour of individuals and rms is remarkably malleable: once `rules of
the game' are established by the government, behavioural changes are un-
dertaken by the private sector aiming to maximise self-interest. This often
leads to unanticipated eects.
Hence, the task of public administration in India has to be rooted in sophis-
ticated and incentive-compatible government programs which deliver a high
bang for the buck - where resources are used frugally and yet a great deal
is done in terms of delivering consumption and risk-reduction to the bottom
quartile.
As an example, consider the public distribution system (PDS). At rst blush,
the objective of giving food to poor people is a noble one. However, the PDS
distorts market signals, promotes black market activity and smuggling, is
poorly targeted. As Rajiv Gandhi observed, the bulk of the money spent on
PDS fails to reach the poor.
Even when PDS money does reach the poor, there are subtle consequences
which need to be taken into account. By lowering the cost of wheat or rice,
PDS free up resources that can be spent in other ways. Households may shift
resoures towards expensive foods (such as meat) or towards non-food items.
The overall impact of the PDS money that reaches the poor, for nutrition of
the poor, is not obvious.
The academic literature oers many warnings about these eects. Kochar
(2005) nds that the PDS has only a limited impact on caloric intake (sug-
gesting switching by households towards non-food consumption). Tarozzi
(2005) nds that PDS had a limited impact upon the weight of children.
Jensen and Miller (2010) undertake randomised experiments in China, and
nd no evidence that subsidies improved nutrition.
This example illustrates the basic point: While it may appear that subsidised
rice and wheat for poor people is a desirable activity of the government, the
overall impact is far from clear, both in terms of the leakages in administra-
tion (which were visible in Rajiv Gandhi's time) and in the overall impacts
upon households (which are now visible in the academic literature).
The subsidy on petroleum products, which became deeply entrenched in
India and has taken considerable eort to remove, needs to be seen in a
historical perspective.6 From 1970 to 1973, the world price of oil went up
from $1.2 to $3.65 per barrel. This tripling of prices was fully passed on to
6We are grateful to Swaminathan Anklesara Aiyar for these ideas.
32the Indian consumer. In 1973-74, the world price went up further to $10 a
barrel. This next tripling was also fully passed on to the Indian consumer.
Finally, a third tripling took place in 1980, when crude oil tripled to $30
a barrel. Once again, Indira Gandhi passed on the entire price rise to the
consumer. Policy makers in India need to go back towards this ability to
abjure from administered prices under conditions of dramatic uctuations of
the free market price.
From this cautious perspective, three big ideas can be identied that are
quite likely to be useful.
The rst is the Aadhar program. If each household has a unique number and
a bank account attached to the number, and if cash can ow directly from
North Block to this account without any intermediaries, then the only im-
pediment faced in poverty alleviation is a master table containing the names
and numbers of all poor households in India. With this table in hand, the
Ministry of Finance could directly eliminate mass poverty in India. A rough
calculation is highly revealing: If 2% of GDP or Rs.110,000 crore are de-
voted to cash transfers into the poorest 20 crore people, this constitutes a
transfer or Rs.27,500 per year (i.e. Rs.2292 per month) for a household of
ve. With such a capability in hand, a broad array of existing government
programs and interventions, aimed at addressing the problem of poverty, can
be dismantled, thus yielding enormous improvements in India through the
elimination of corruption, downsizing of government, reduction in expendi-
ture, and removal of economic distortions thus enabling higher GDP growth.
This scale of expenditure { 2 per cent of GDP for the comprehensive elimi-
nation of poverty in India { is consistent with the broad goal of living within
a tax/GDP ratio of 18-20 per cent of GDP.
The second grand theme is that of decentralisation. The 73rd and 74th
amendments represent an \unnished revolution" that was begun by Rajiv
Gandhi. The implementation of the Model GST, and transfer of a fraction
of GST revenues to the local government, will create a new resource ow
into local government. The creation of such a scal base is also incentive-
compatible as it aligns the interests of citizens with the interests of elected
ocials of local bodies. As an example, the GST collections of Bhopal will
partly go back into the municipality of Bhopal, thus closing the loop from
local public goods to local GDP to local tax collections to local expenditure
on local public goods. By improving accountability, the outcomes in critical
local public goods would be improved, which would yield strong increases in
the welfare of citizens.
The third grand theme is that of public provision coupled with private pro-
33duction. As an example, the Rashtriya Beem Swasthya Yojana (RSBY)
combines public resources with access to privately run health facilities. Par-
ticipating households are empowered to become customers, to choose from
multiple competing private health service providers. Payments are only made
to a private health service provider when a household patronises this provider:
thus poor people are empowered as customers, and there are strong incen-
tives for producers to serve the citizen. This is in contrast with public sector
health facilities, where salaries and budgetary allocations are insensitive to
the views of citizens. There are enormous eciency gains which can be ob-
tained by separating public sector provision from public sector production
and by empowering citizens as customers through public funding.7
6 Diminishing economic risk
European-style social democracy involves two grand themes: redistribution
from the rich to the poor, and of risk management at the individual level
by the State. The risk faced by individuals on account of unemployment,
health, disability, etc. is sought to be addressed by government programs.
When the government interacts with the individual citizen in understanding
events such as illness, unemployment or disability, onerous challenges of pub-
lic administration are faced in running transaction-intensive systems where
civil servants have discretion. There is, however, an alternative path to risk
reduction which works at the level of the economy and not the individual.
This involves reducing macroeconomic risk.
The poorest of countries lack macroeconomic policy frameworks through
which scal and monetary policy stabilise the business cycle. This yields
substantial uctuations of output, and generates political pressures from in-
dividuals faced with negative economic shocks. The volatility of GDP growth
in India is between two to three times larger than that seen in OECD coun-
tries. A crucial part of the evolution into middle income is the creation of
these policy frameworks through which macroeconomic uncertainty is low-
ered.
Macroeconomic crises have direct and adverse eects upon the poor. As
an example, Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque (2010) document the impact
of Argentina's crisis of 2002 upon birth weight. The deterioration of birth
7The Centre for Civil Society has produced a series of research papers on the subject
of rethinking education on these lines.
34weight in the crisis works out to one-sixth of the distance in birth weight
between a rich country (the US) and a poor country (Pakistan). Reduced
birth weight is associated with sustained diculties through life on issues of
health, learning and labour market outcomes.
The poor bear the brunt of business cycle volatility. Guillaumont and Ko-
rachais (2008) nd that in addition to the negative impact of macroeconomic
instability upon growth, macroeconomic instability reduces the amount of
poverty reduction that is obtained per unit of growth. Those with tenured
jobs and nominal wage rigidity do not experience the ups and downs of
macroeconomic uctuations. The industrial worker in the fringes of Surat is
the one who lost his job in the global crisis of 2008. Once the poor fall into
poverty traps in a downturn, they nd it dicult to break free of the cycle
of indebtedness, ill health and loss of human capital.
Stabilisation policy is important in that it would reduce the shocks that these
households suer. In recent years, considerable work has been done in India
on designing the policy frameworks for reducing business cycle uctuations
(Rajan, 2008; Shah, 2008; Shah and Patnaik, 2010), and a good deal of
international experience is available. The three key elements of this include:
1. Recasting RBI so that it has independence, and is held accountable for
achieving an ination target. This would involve divesting RBI of numerous
other roles.
2. Achieving a high level of scal soundness, so that the debt/GDP ratio stays
below 60% of GDP at all times. This involves achieving surpluses in good
times and decits in bad times.
3. Allowing automatic stabilisers to vary the decit through the business cycle.
In a downturn, the spending on NREGA would be higher and tax collections
on personal income tax would be lower, thus yielding an enlargement of the
decit. Conversely, in good times, surpluses should ensue automatically.
Macroeconomic stabilisation thus requires relatively simple institutional struc-
tures such as scal, nancial and monetary policy. From the viewpoint of
public administration, this is an easier path to take because it involves policy
frameworks at the level of the economy and not transaction-intensive pro-
grams which interact with individual citizens. In this sense, prevention is
better than cure.
357 Policy directions in middle income
In the last 30 years, India has expanded GDP by six times, by achieving an
average growth rate of 6.17 per cent per year. This has abolished the level of
deprivation which was manifestly visible circa 1979. This growth acceleration
is the rst time in millenia that India has substantially enlarged the pie within
a generation. This expansion of output has changed the opportunity set of
policy makers. In 1979, it was not possible for India to build highways in
India, given the price tag of $1 million per kilometre; today it is.
The main goal of economic policy today should be to achieve a minimum of
8 per cent GDP growth over the next 30 years, so that GDP will grow by
more than 10 times. This would take aggregate GDP from the existing value
of $1.2 trillion to a level of over $12 trillion. If this is achieved, then the
resources available to the State would be completely transformed once again,
as they have been through the last 30 years of growth. When GDP is $12
trillion, if 2% of GDP is earmarked for cash transfers, this would represent a
sum of $240 billion.
While this is a highly desirable destination, we should not take it for granted.
Over the last 200 years, we have seen numerous examples of countries which
failed to achieve sustained high growth. The task for a middle income country
is to build State capacity on the core functions of the State, so that the engine
of growth is able to continue to work for a few decades more, so as to avoid the
`middle income trap' where many countries have failed to produce sustained
growth over long periods of time.
7.1 Empirical guidance on the two key questions
The empirical literature guides us on the constraints faced by policy makers
in two respects:
 How large can the tax/GDP ratio become, in a low income country?
Gordon and Li (2009) analyses the tax/GDP ratio for developing countries
from 1996 to 2001. The tax/GDP ratio for all developing countries, consol-
idating across all levels of government, averages to 17.6%.For countries in
India's range of GDP the average is 16.7%: this is not signicantly dier-
ent from that seen in India today. It is only beyond a per capita GDP of
$9,206 that a tax/GDP ratio of 25% is achieved. This suggests that for a
few decades, it would be wise to live within our means with an aggregate
expenditure of all three levels of government to below 18-20 per cent of GDP.
36Table 6 Resourcing the Indian State: The inecient scenario
This table envisages the consequences of a direct pursuit for a high tax/GDP ratio through
higher tax rates, with weak scal discipline leading to threats of a scal crisis, with poor
scal/nancial/monetary institution building that induces high GDP uctuations with
the consequent adverse implications for investment and immediate political pressure for
welfare programs. This is also a scenario where a weak and uncondent India engages in
reduced international economic integration out of fear of international crisis.
The two key parameters which characterise this scenario are: average GDP growth over
the coming 20 years of 6 per cent per annum, and a high tax/GDP ratio of 24 per cent.
An average population growth of 1% is assumed. All calculations are in real terms, at
2009-10 prices. Hence, rupee values are directly interpretable as relating to the 2009-10
value of the rupee.
Year GDP Population GDP Tax revenues Tax revenues
(Trn. Rs.) (Bln.) (per capita) (Trn. Rs.) (per capita)
2009-10 58.6 1.10 53,272 12.9 12,785
2019-20 104.9 1.22 86,367 25.2 20,728
2029-30 187.9 1.34 140,021 45.1 33,605
 When can a country achieve signicant redistribution?
Ravallion (2009) analyses data for 90 developing countries, aiming to mea-
sure the `capacity for redistribution'. This is measured by the marginal tax
rate on those who are not poor { by rich-country standards { that is needed
to cover the poverty gap or to provide a poverty-level of basic income, judged
by developing-country standards.
He nds that for low income countries such as India, the required tax burdens
are found to be prohibitive: often calling for marginal tax rates of 100 percent
or more. The opportunity for doing such redistribution is found later in the
development process: after per capita consumption exceeds $4000 per year.
These arguments suggest that the opportunities visible to policy makers dier
dramatically between two groups of countries: the rich and the poor. In
the present phase of India's growth, it seems appropriate to have modest
aspirations for the tax/GDP ratio and for redistribution.
7.2 An illustrative calculation
These alternatives on resourcing the Indian State are illustrated by compar-
ing two scenarios. In both scenarios, population growth of 1 per cent per
year is projected for the next 20 years.
The rst inecient scenario is one with:
37Table 7 Resourcing the Indian State: The ecient scenario
This table envisages the consequences of a growth-friendly environment, with a pursuit of
a reduced tax/GDP ratio through lower tax rates, with high scal discipline, with high
scal/nancial/monetary institution building that induces low GDP uctuations with the
consequent positive implications for investment and reduced political pressure for welfare
programs. This is also a scenario where a strong and condent India engages in high
international economic integration without concerns about international crises.
The two key parameters which characterise this scenario are: average GDP growth over
the coming 20 years of 8 per cent per annum, and a tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent. An
average population growth of 1% is assumed. All calculations are in real terms, at 2009-10
prices. Hence, rupee values are directly interpretable as relating to the 2009-10 value of
the rupee.
Year GDP Population GDP Tax revenues Tax revenues
(Trn. Rs.) (Bln.) (per capita) (Trn. Rs.) (per capita)
2009-10 58.6 1.10 53,272 11.7 10,654
2019-20 126.5 1.22 104,119 25.3 20,823
2029-30 273.1 1.34 203,494 54.6 40,699
1. A direct pursuit for a high tax/GDP ratio through higher tax rates,
2. Weak scal discipline leading to threats of a scal crisis,
3. Incentives for distortionary policies including nancial repression and mon-
etary policy distortions in an attempt to respond to the scal problem,
4. Poor scal/nancial/monetary institution building that induces high GDP
uctuations, with the consequent adverse implications for investment and
continual political pressure for welfare programs from citizens exposed to
high economic risk,
5. A weak and uncondent India engages in reduced international economic
integration out of fear of international crises.
In this scenario, a higher tax/GDP ratio of 24 per cent is obtained. However,
this combination of features is projected to yield an inferior growth rate of 6
per cent per annum.
The calculations about this scenario are shown in Table 6. Per capita GDP
expands strongly from Rs.53,272 per person today to Rs.140,021 over the
coming 20 years. Through this, tax revenues per capita { the resource base
of the State { are projected to expand from Rs.12,785 per capita to Rs.33,605
per capita. This enhanced resource base will be available for the State for the
purpose of either producing public goods or undertaking poverty alleviation
for the poorest 20% of the population.
38The alternative ecient scenario is one where:
1. The State aspires for a reduced tax/GDP ratio, with lower tax rates,
2. High scal discipline leading to the elimination of scal stress,
3. Strong scal/nancial/monetary institution building generates reduced GDP
uctuations. This bolsters investment, and also reduces the immediate po-
litical pressure for welfare programs,
4. A strong and condent India engages in high international economic inte-
gration without fear of international crises.
In this scenario, a reduced tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent is obtained. How-
ever, this combination of features is projected to yield a higher growth rate
of 8 per cent per annum. These are modest and reasonable dierences: A
dierence in projected GDP growth of 2 percentage points, and a dierence
in the tax/GDP ratio of 4 percentage points, across the two policy packages.
Even in the pessimistic scenario, India is projected to be safely away from
the `Hindu growth rate' of 3.5 per cent: the projected value of 6 per cent
optimistically replicates the average growth of 6.17 per cent obtained in the
last 30 years.
The calculations about the ecient scenario are shown in Table 7. Per capita
GDP expands strongly from Rs.53,272 per person today to Rs.203,494 over
the coming 20 years. Through this, tax revenues per capita { the resource
base of the State { are projected to expand from Rs.10,655 per capita to
Rs.40,699 per capita. This enhanced resource base will be available for the
State for the purpose of either producing public goods or undertaking poverty
alleviation for the poorest 20% of the population.
The comparison between these two scenarios is striking. Table 6 assumes a
higher tax/GDP ratio of 24 per cent: it assumes that the State will set forth
in a quest for a high tax/GDP ratio and actually attain it. In contrast, Table
7 assumes a reduced tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent. Yet, under the scenario
shown in Tax 7, the power of compounding with a higher GDP growth rate is
so powerful that the per capita resources available to the State endup being
21 per cent higher { Rs.40,699 per person as opposed to Rs.33,605 per person.
This emphasises the idea that the indirect route { of strengthening GDP { is
a superior path to resourcing the State when compared with the direct path
{ of higher tax rates and a high tax/GDP ratio.
More importantly, the scenario of Table 6 yields inferior personal incomes
because the GDP per capita is projected to grow to Rs.140,000 per person,
39while the alternative scenario yields a superior value of Rs203,494 per person:
a dierence of 45 per cent. From the viewpoint of the individual, the scenario
of Table 7 is thus superior because personal income is higher and because
there is a greater provision of public goods by the State. If the citizen of
India was presented with a choice between these two scenarios, there is no
question about which one is superior.
These calculations are, of course, only illustrative. The results are entirely
driven by two numbers: GDP growth of 6 per cent versus 8 per cent, and a
tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent versus 24 per cent. There is room for legitimate
disagreement about how alternative policy packages can yield dierent nu-
merical values for these two parameters. Yet, this calculation illustrates the
key point: about the dominant role for GDP growth in generating substantial
resources for the State.
Both scenarios err on the side of conservatism. The policy package sketched
as the `inecient' scenario could easily yield outcomes worse than those pro-
jected, for the GDP growth projected envisages that India will replicate the
performance of the last 30 years of economic reform. Global economic history
encourages us to be cautious about trend extrapolation in economic growth:
most countries which got high growth for 30 years failed to replicate that
high growth in the next 30 years (Pritchett, 2000). Numerous countries got
out of the ranks of the poorest, but oundered in the `middle income trap'.
Conversely, there is also a good chance that the `ecient' policy package
described above could unleash growth of above 8 per cent; a few countries
like Korea and Taiwan have managed to achieve long-term trend growth of
above 8 per cent thus proving that it can be done.
8 Conclusion
The broad picture emphasised in this paper is one where in the next three
doublings of per capita GDP { from $1100 per capita to $8800 per capita { the
gains of the poor will come primarily from growth and from superior supply of
public goods. In this period, there is limited scope for redistribution, and the
focus of public policy should be on a government that delivers genuine public
goods, which benet all. This includes the establishment of frameworks for
macroeconomic stabilisation, since reduced uctuations are a public good
which benet all.
The primary tool through which the State can obtain resources is higher
40GDP growth. A tax/GDP ratio of 20 per cent, with expenditure that is just
slightly above 20 per cent, is the reasonable scenario which can be envis-
aged for the coming 30 years. Mobilising greater resources for the State is
thus synonymous with undertaking reforms which yield higher GDP growth.
Alongside this, a good part of the concerns about economic uncertainty,
which lead to a desire for European-style social democracy, can be addressed
by undertaking scal, nancial and monetary policy reforms through which
business cycle uctuations are diminished. In addition, fresh thinking about
mechanisms of expenditure can yield greater bang for the buck thus freeing
up resources.
GDP growth is thus the most important element of all three points of view:
the elimination of mass poverty, the increase in welfare of the entire popula-
tion, and the resourcing of the State.
Very few countries of the world have sustained growth for many decades. The
economic reforms of the early 1990s decisively broke with India's dirigiste
past. This gave an escape from the Hindu growth rate which aicted India
in the 1970s. But it is important to avoid the complacent assumption that
India will replicate this `miracle' over the coming 30 years, or do better.8
While the possibility is real, it would be incorrect to assume that our fond
hopes are our destiny. Many countries have made policy mistakes through
which the fundamental microeconomic foundations of high GDP growth have
been damaged, through which an episode of growth petered out.
Considerable caution needs to be exercised in Indian policy thinking today.
The gains of the last 20 years were rooted in the economic reforms of this
period. If the pace of reforms slackens, then growth will decline. At the
same time, India has an enormous opportunity over the next 30 years {
rooted in sound demographics { to move GDP growth up, if fundamental
change is achieved in the functioning of the State. If growth accelerates,
then per capita GDP growth of 7 per cent is attainable. This would yield
one doubling of per capita growth in each decade, through which per capita
GDP would reach $8800 over 3 decades.
If this happy scenario comes together, it will put India into the zone of per
capita GDP of $9,206 in 2040. Once this phase is completed, State capacity
would be at a dierent level. The tax/GDP ratio would be higher and GDP
would be higher, thus bringing bigger resources into the coers of the State.
8Episodes of high growth sustained over many decades are so rare in development
economics, that Nobel Laureate Robert E. Lucas, Jr. termed them as `miracles' (Lucas,
1993).
41Administrative capacity would be higher. The burning problems of weak
public goods on fundamental issues such as the police and judiciary would
be absent, thus allowing a focus of top leadership upon other issues. At this
point, it will become possible to evaluate a more ambitious expenditure plan
for government since the tax/GDP ratio can then potentially rise above 20
per cent.
A premature escalation of expenditure plans has the possibility of contami-
nating the foundations of GDP growth, through three channels of inuence.
First, welfare programs undermine the incentives for work. As an example,
to the extent that NREGA has reduced the incentives in favour of migration,
this runs against the strategic picture of Indian growth being associated with
rural to urban migration. Second, a large State requires high tax rates. The
economic distortions associated with taxation goes up as the square of the
tax rate; thus high tax rates undermine GDP growth. Third, expansive ex-
penditure plans are often associated with an array of problems such as scal
crises, nancial repression, capital controls, and underdeveloped institutions
on scal, nancial and monetary policy. The slowly unfolding demographic
transition, which led to a gradual crumbling of the European welfare state by
reducing the number of workers in the economy, is an even greater problem
for India given the projected rapidity with which the demographic transi-
tion will come about in India. All these three channels imply that there is
a conict between the core goal of high GDP growth and the prospect of
undertaking a large expenditure program in the short run.
This thinking takes place at a time when India faces a unique and historic
opportunity for high GDP growth, from 2010 to 2035, owing to the `demo-
graphic dividend'. If this opportunity is not utilised properly, it will never
recur again in the future. India will then face the bleak problems of a com-
bination of mass poverty with an ageing population.
The most important responsibility of our generation is that of correctly exe-
cuting the economic policy decisions today, so that this happy scenario does
arise: one with 8 per cent average growth over the coming 30 years. If this
correctly comes about, then the frontier of possibilities for policy that will
be faced by the next generation will be enlarged. That generation will be
able to choose whether it is benecial to go beyond a tax/GDP ratio of 20
per cent.
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